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ARMY – FULL SPECTRUM RELEVANCE AND READINESS

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ABSTRACT

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To be relevant, our Army organization needs to be able both to demonstrate and to articulate its relevance. Relevance is a fragile asset of our Army. We need to seek opportunities to demonstrate our relevance to the military and political climate of the future. Relevance is required across the full spectrum of future Army operations. However, relevance alone is not sufficient. The Army needs to be ready for operations spanning this full spectrum of operations.

Readiness is only achieved when leaders know their missions, have the required resources, training, and preparation for those missions, and finally execute those assigned missions with vigor and professionalism. The issue of Army readiness came to public attention when in the fall of 1999 two divisions reported they were "C-4". They were "C-4" or not prepared to go to war because of the ongoing peace operation that they were either in the process of conducting or because they were recovering from the peace operation that they had recently competed. Readiness for MTW operations is not sufficient. We must prepare to engage a full spectrum of operations, we can no longer afford to only prepare for war and treat all the other operations as missions to be accomplished "on the fly". A systematic approach to Army readiness is developed and proposed in this paper.

Readiness without relevance gives way to useless organizations. Relevance without readiness gives way to inept organizations. The Army of the new millennium needs to both demonstrate and articulate its relevance as well as adopting a system that readies it for dominance across the full spectrum of operations.

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PREFACE

While many of these ideas are presented in this paper they are not all my own. My seminar mates have discussed this issue at length during the course of our year of study here at the Army War College. While all of Seminar 5 has contributed in some way, I would like to explicitly recognize both Charley Higbee and Gary Patton for their insightful comments and discussion, especially concerning the initial formation of the idea of a rotation schedule for the Army Corps. Additionally, like all Army War College students, I would like to thank the support of the library staff for their constant optimism and professional support.

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ARMY - FULL SPECTRUM RELEVANCE AND READINESS

OVERVIEW

As the United States Army passes over the threshold to the new millennium, there are many different tasks that our institution may be called upon to perform. Joint Vision 2010 calls for a full spectrum of operations in which all our services must be dominant.[1] The Army has endorsed this full spectrum of operations as a specific task to be accomplished.[2] This spectrum of operations ranges from fighting the traditional wars of our nation (Major Theaters of War or MTWs) to the variety of smaller operations under the heading of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW or Peace Operations). There are two keys to the long-term future of the United States Army's full spectrum of dominance: relevance and readiness.

Relevance is defined by the Merriam Webster Dictionary as, "relation to the matter at hand, practical, and applicable".[3] To express this concept from another point of view, relevance is the applicability and practicability of the Army to the future military and political needs of our country. There are three perspectives of relevance that our Army must strive to maintain and nurture. First, our political leaders must view the Army with a perception of relevance. The professional accomplishment of assigned missions which cover the full spectrum of operations ensures Army relevance with our political leaders. Second, the American populous must see and understand this relevance of the Army to its future missions. Repeated mission accomplishment of our assigned tasks will ensure Army relevance in the eyes of the American populace. This relevance will assist in recruiting young Americas to join the Army to serve their nation. Because all our soldiers are recruited from the American people, this relevance is needed for the long-term national support of our Army. Young Americans will want to join an organization that is relevant and sees itself as having a future in executing meaningful missions for our nation. Finally, the Army itself needs to internalize this relevance for meeting its future roles and missions. This internal relevance must be inculcated and articulated by our leadership as we conduct military operations within the future political climate of our world. Our Army needs to see itself as relevant to the future for conducting operations in support of our national interests while serving under the national command authority. These accomplishments will maintain the esprit and dedication to our Army by its soldiers and leaders. The Army must strive to maintain its relevance when viewed by our political leaders, relevance perceived by the American people, and internal relevance viewed by our serving members to remain engaged in the future defense of our nation and national interests.

Readiness is derived from the word ready, which the Merriam Webster Dictionary defines as, "prepared for use or action, likely to do something indicated".[4] Readiness is the Army's preparation and capability to execute tasks assigned from our political leaders. The Army needs to embrace and even

seek out missions across the full spectrum of operations from MTW through Peace Operations to MOOTW where the Army can demonstrate its readiness. However, the mere possession of readiness is not sufficient for the Army. We must both demonstrate and articulate our readiness. While possessing readiness is necessary for the accomplishment of our missions, it is not sufficient within itself. We as an Army need to be able to express our readiness to both our political leaders and the American people. It is necessary to express our readiness to our political leaders so they know and understand our capabilities as well as our limitations. It is equally necessary for us to be able to express our readiness to the American population so they will feel confident in recommending their sons and daughters to join the Army team and will be confident in our ability to accomplish missions as we progress into the future. Both readiness and relevance are required for the Army to retain its full spectrum dominance as we prepare for a new millennium.

Readiness without relevance gives way to useless organizations. The best and most highly trained telephone switchboard operators, while highly trained, proficient and ready, are not relevant in today's society since computer switches can do more, faster, with fewer errors than they can. A lack of relevance leads to organizations that are of little to no value to society. To be relevant, the Army must be relevant to fulfilling the needs of our country and political leaders while being ready to successfully accomplish our assigned missions when called upon.

Relevance without readiness gives way to inept organizations. Most local fire departments claim they can extinguish fires in burning buildings. However, if on the day of a fire, the fire department finds out that their outdated hoses no longer fit the new fire hydrants in the city, the firemen are reduced to spectators at the fire. Likewise, our Army must be capable of achieving success in all our assigned missions. We need to be able to "walk the walk" as our leaders "talk the talk". For nothing destroys the credibility of an organization faster than failure at what is perceived as a core competency mission. Relevance without readiness leads to the perception that the organization is inept, ineffective, or unnecessary.

Clearly, there are two keys required for the Army of the future, relevance and readiness. Neither relevance nor readiness is sufficient alone. The Army will have many opportunities to demonstrate its readiness. Congressman Steve Buyer noted, "Currently, there are more than 265,000 military people "engaged" in over 135 countries."[5] The Army must routinely and constantly demonstrate and articulate its relevance and readiness. MG Bruce Scott noted, "Effectively telling the Army story requires intense coordination and cooperation from throughout the Army."[6] Both relevance to the future needs of our country and Army readiness to successful accomplish assigned missions are necessary for the continued political and popular support of our Army as we begin the new millennium.

RELEVANCE

To be relevant, our Army organization needs to be able both to demonstrate and to articulate its relevance. Many Americans watched the Army operate in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that the Army went to Saudi Arabia with a military mission and it executed that mission violently and with great precision. This was an overwhelming demonstration of Army relevance to the situation at hand. However, with the recent operation in Kosovo the conclusion drawn by many Americans was that the Army was not needed for this operation and may not be needed in future wars or conflicts.[7] In Kosovo, the capabilities of the Air Force were showcased and many Americans now believe the United States military can cause belligerents to capitulate by bombing them into submission. Our Army needs both the opportunity and ability to demonstrate its relevance when called upon to do so. Additionally our Army leadership needs a means to express its relevance to our political leaders and the American people. Only by demonstration and articulation of Army relevance to future political situations can we strengthen the American understanding of our capabilities and solidify the support for our organization as we proceed into the next millennium.

It is helpful to review the full range of tasks the Army may be called upon to perform in the future as we seek to express and demonstrate our relevance. Missions for the military are expressed in several key documents: National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2010.

The national Security Strategy calls for forces that can SHAPE, RESPOND, and PREPARE. This strategy includes:[8]

- Actions we as a nation undertake before a conflict erupts (Shaping)
- Actions we as a nation take to resolve a conflict (Responding)
- Actions we as a nation take to be ready for an uncertain future (Preparing)

Military activities in the shaping phase of our national security strategy include: building coalitions, defense cooperation, security assistance, training and exercises. In each of these areas, the Army has roles and missions in executing this phase of national security strategy.[9] Our forward deployment allows the Army to assist in building coalitions and strengthening the bonds of defense cooperation. Additionally, joint and combined exercises conducted overseas further build these international relationships and assists in promoting regional stability. Clearly, the Army's successful accomplishment of dictated shaping operations assists in our perceived relevance by political leaders and the American populace.

Joint vision 2010 requires the military to possess full spectrum dominance.[10] The Army seeks to possess a full spectrum of dominance. Full spectrum operation includes operations from the high end of conflict (MTWs), through peace operations (Peace Enforcement, Peace Making, and Peace Keeping) to all the "other little tasks" contained in military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is no longer acceptable for the Army to claim that its only mission is to fight and win our nations wars. The old train of thought is represented by MG Ellis when he wrote, "At battalion through division level, training for stability and support missions or small scale contingencies represents a minor distraction to the large-scale, collective warfighting skills required for successful execution of high-intensity conflict missions."[11] Undoubtedly, winning MTWs is our primary mission and we must never fail in this mission. But the Army has other missions as well. These missions span the full spectrum of operations - missions that support the shaping operations of our nation and our national security strategy. In the past, the Army has taken the approach that if we actively prepare for war (MTWs) then these other tasks can be accomplished by redirecting the efforts of highly trained Army warfighting units. Those days are past. Congressman Floyd D. Spence supports this view when he was quoted as saying, "maintaining combat proficiency is nearly impossible for units deployed to operations other than war."[12] We now need to prepare for MOOTW or peace operations and MTWs. This preparation issue is addressed further in the next section concerning readiness.

The National Military Strategy calls for the accomplishment of the dual goals of promoting peace and stability while retaining the capability (when needed) to defeat the adversaries of the United States.[13] These goals are accomplished through the strategy of Shape, Respond, and Prepare. The Army, to be relevant to the future military and political conditions, needs to be prepared to execute both prongs of this strategy: promoting peace and winning wars. Dedicated preparation of forces for each mission is clearly required.

Relevance is a fragile asset of our Army. We need to seek opportunities to articulate and demonstrate our relevance to the military and political climate of the future. This goal was articulated by Secretary Caldera when he said, "we must make a concerted effort to communicate to the current generation of young Americans the value of service."[14] Our Army can not afford mission failures in supporting our nation, thus we need relevant forces ready to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict as stated in Joint Vision 2010.

READINESS

The Army is deeply concerned with the readiness of its force and its preparation to conduct full spectrum operations. So concerned, that the Chief of Staff of the Army has dictated that a study group from this year's Army War College class be dedicated to studying this issue and making a recommendation as to how to correct the perceived readiness deficiency.

This readiness deficiency is not new. RAND has completed several studies that articulate the effect that MOOTW operations and OPTEMPO have upon the Army. The 1997 report Army Forces for Operations Other Than War addresses the readiness impact in Chapter 5.[15] The study makes the point that the ongoing MOOTW operation does not leave sufficient conventional forces to conduct MTW. This study shows the severe over-tasking of active duty Transportation Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Combat Support, and Engineer forces. In a follow-up study in 1998 Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness Rand concludes there are some win-win situations when conducting peace operations or MOOTW.[16] The CSS units on any deployment will conduct missions similar to their wartime missions. On any deployment (MTW or MOOTW) vehicles need to be repaired, serviced, and fueled; soldiers need to eat, training needs to be conducted and some CS/CSS skills can be practiced. Further, this study goes on to warn against establishing a designated force that only conducts MOOTW operations. For these MOOTW specific forces quickly would feel overused and inferior to combat fighting forces. Clearly the Army needs a mechanism by which it can retain its warfighting edge as it deliberately prepares for the inevitable MOOTW operations that we will be called upon to execute to support shaping missions.

The survey of AWC Class of 2000 (Annex A) overwhelming supports providing dedicated training time for Peace Operations.[17] This dedicated training time is supported even if it would require that some portions of MTW training be neglected. We need to train for MTWs and we need to train for MOOTW, however we need to focus on one mission at a time.

Previous leaders have often lamented that the Army is "broken" since we always try to stuff "ten pounds of stuff" into a single "five-pound sack". This point of view was articulated by MG Grange when he wrote the lead article for Armed Forces Journal in the December 1999 issue entitled, "Ready for What?"[18] The future will not reduce our missions, we will still have "ten pounds of stuff" to be accomplished. The solution to our problem lies not in reducing our missions but in developing a second five-pound sack into which we can place our "stuff". After all, two five-pound sacks can carry ten pounds of stuff we need to be capable of accomplishing. These two sacks or capabilities for the future Army

would be the preparation and execution for MTWs as well as the preparation and execution for MOOTW operations.

The issue of Army readiness came to public attention when in the fall of 1999 two divisions reported they were "C-4".[19] They were "C-4" or not prepared to go to war because of the ongoing peace operation that they were either; in the process of conducting, or because they were recovering from the peace operations that they had recently competed. The question that needs to be addressed is: "Should the Army be expected to keep all 10 divisions at a readiness level where they are all ready to go to war?" The answer is no, and we can approach this issue initially from the point of view of our sister services.

ARMY READINESS - FOLLOW THE OTHER SERVICES' MODEL

The idea of following the other service's model for training and rotation was articulated by COL Robert B. Killebrew, "the Army urgently needs to develop a strategic concept for employment of landpower similar to the Navy's "From the Sea" series or the Air Force's "Global Reach" series."[20] The Navy makes no bones about the issue, for every carrier that is employed (steaming or on deployment) they need to have three carriers in the inventory. Thus, one is deployed at sea while one is in maintenance/dry dock and the third is conducting training in preparation to be deployed.

The Marine Corps has a similar system. For each MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) afloat, there is one MEU in training preparing to assume the afloat mission while another is recovering from it recently completed tour of duty at sea. Again the model is simple - for one constantly engaged or deployed force, there needs to be three of these forces in the force structure.

The Army is presently tasked to perform two key missions in our national military strategy. We are to be prepared to RESPOND and fight the nation's wars (MTW or Major Theaters of War) while we are SHAPING the future political/military environment by conducting peace operations or military operations other than war (MOOTW).[21] To have all ten Army divisions constantly prepared to conduct the nations wars while not preparing for peace operations or MOOTW is not prudent planning. It does not take a rocket scientist to realize the Army has a much greater probability in being tasked to conduct peace operations or MOOTW missions than it does in conducting major theater warfare. Our recent history is evidence that peace operations are much more probable and prevalent than war.

To be prepared for the SHAPING (MOOTW/Peace Operations) and RESPONDING (MTW) missions that the Army will be called upon to execute by the present national security strategy, a rotation schedule is needed where units can focus on either peace operations/MOOTW or focus on warfighting

skills or MTW and then prepare accordingly. This rotation system would include four phases where units are:

1) training for warfighting or Major Theaters of War (MTW)

2) are prepared to execute warfighting (Major Theaters of Wars)

3) preparing/training for shaping/peace operations or MOOTW

4) are prepared and executing shaping operations (MOOTW)

This rotation system, while similar to the Navy's carrier rotation system, would support our national military strategy of SHAPE - RESPOND - PREPARE.[22] Not to build in a rest or recovery phase into this rotation system would only doom future units to experience the exhaustion that was represented by the divisions that declared they were not combat ready or "C-4". The rest or recovery phase for each Corps would be the first month of the preparation or training phase for warfighting and the first month of preparing or training phase for shaping or peace operations. At all times there would be:

- one corps training for warfighting (MTW)
- one corps prepared for immediate response to MTW requirements (MTW)
- one corps training and preparing for shaping operations (MOOTW)
- and one corps conducting shaping operations (MOOTW).

While this rotation cycle would be used to spread the operational workload across all Army units, it may require the repositioning and restructuring of major army units (Corps). This rotation schedule would require each Corps to be interchangeable so any Corps could assume the lead for either MTW support or for peace operations/MOOTW as missions and rotations dictate.

Presently, the Army has 10 divisions. If one division (with three brigades) is "held" as a rapid response force and one division equivalent is forward deployed in Korea, then the following rotation schedule can be established. The six-month rotation schedule (in gray below) would include the 4 Corps units (Headquarters) and 8 rotating divisions assigned to those Corps.

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Forward Deployed Forces

Ready Reaction Division

| DEPLOYED FORCES: |
| 1 Division - Korea |
| Non-rotational / Committed |

| Ready Reaction Division: |
| 82nd Airborne Division |

ROTATIONAL FORCES

MTW MISSION PHASE:
Corps with 2 Divisions
(6 months)

UNIT RECOVERY AND MOOTW TRAINING PHASE:
Corps and 2 Divisions
(6 months)

MOOTW MISSION PHASE:
Corps with 2 Divisions
(6 months)

UNIT RECOVERY AND MTW TRAINING PHASE:
Corps and 2 Divisions
(6 months)

FIGURE 1: NOTIONAL CORPS ROTATION SCHEDULE

Our present national security strategy includes SHAPE - RESPOND - PREARE. Further, we need the capability to execute two near simultaneous MTW responses. This rotational system of training and employing Corps would allow the Army leadership to articulate its relevance to future military missions. The fact that the Army leaders could point to and Congressional Leaders could visit the units preparing for shaping operations as well as those units preparing for MTW support bolsters the perceived relevance of the Army. The Army would gain credibility with our congressional leaders and the American people when clearly defined units are supporting both the shaping and response missions.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: TWO MTW RESPONSE

For a two MTW response, initially the ready division would be deployed followed closely with the Corps in MTW response. When or if it is decided that additional forces are needed beyond these three divisions and Corps Headquarters for either a larger single MTW or a second MTW, the Army leadership would have several options. First, they could decide to activate and deploy the Corps that had just relinquished MTW mission cycle. Second, they could accelerate the training cycle for the Corps presently in their MTW training phase for deployment to support the contingency crisis. The third and fourth Corps could only be tasked to support a MTW response when Peace Operations or MOOTW tasks are severely curtailed or eliminated. In any case, once the Army training and rotation schedule is "broken" to support a large scale MTW(s), the national command authority needs to understand there is a required recovery phase for the Army as a whole at the conclusion of the operation(s). This time is needed for the Army to re-establish the training and mission cycle rotation schedule (resume steady state). We must break the present cycle of hopping from one contingency operation to the next and never recovering our units, their equipment, their training programs, and our soldiers. The third option for our political leaders would be to continue peace operations or MOOTW eith active duty forces and activated National Guard Divisions to add the needed combat power to the MTW situation at hand.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: MISSION PREPARATION

This rotation cycle for each Corps allows the leadership (Corps level and below) to prepare for their upcoming mission cycle, whether that mission cycle is for shaping operations (conducting Peace Operations or MOOTW) or preparation for Major Theater War. This will facilitate commanders in better preparing for their pending mission phase. Now commanders will be able to answer the old question of "What am I to be trained and prepared to do?" Not only will commanders know more of what missions they will be called upon to execute, but their subordinate leaders and soldiers will have an expectation of whether they will deploy and can better to gage their likelihood of deployment by keeping current with ongoing political developments. Equally important, soldiers and leaders can gage when they will not deploy, for example during training cycles, unless a large MTW or multiple MTWs erupt. This expectation by soldiers and leaders can reduce turbulence and increase well being.

Other studies outside the Army have repeatedly reported that the reason that soldiers are willing to fight and die on the battlefield is because of the other soldiers around them. Years ago, the Army tried to institute a concept of cohort units. Here units went through basic training together, deployed together, fought together, and returned to home station together. While a good concept for unit esprit and integrity, the administrative and overhead costs were of this system were overwhelming. The above proposed rotation schedule would not be a cohort system, but it would allow units to train together before deployment. This training will build esprit and camaraderie inculcating the warrior spirit in each soldier

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before they deploy with their unit and friends. A notional example of a two-year training calendar for all the Corps is shown in the table below:

ROTATION SCHEDULE: TWO-YEAR TRAINING CALENDAR

	1st Year Apr - Sept	1st Year Oct - Mar	2nd Year Apr - Sept	2nd Year Oct - Mar
I Corps	MTW Mission	Shaping Prep	Shaping Opns	MTW Training
III Corps	Shaping Prep	Shaping Opns	MTW Training	MTW Mission
V Corps	Shaping Opns	MTW Training	MTW Mission	Shaping Prep
XVIII Corps	MTW Training	MTW Mission	Shaping Prep	Shaping Opns

TABLE 1 - NOTATIONAL CORPS ROTATION SCHEDULE

Additionally, this long range training calendar lets commanders anticipate their missions and forces available. When preparing for peace operations, commanders during their training phase can anticipate requirements to support ongoing peace operations. Commanders can anticipate being tasked to send a battalion to support the Multinational Forces and Observers in the Sinai and/or deploying a brigade to Bosnia, or other missions as they occur. The Army leadership can plan to have a brigade or other smaller piece of their unit deployed during the upcoming shaping execution phase of their rotation schedule, deployed COHORT style and returned to home station 6 months later. When brigades are required as the follow-on forces for the next rotation in Bosnia for example, commanders can ensure their units are prepared (task, condition, and standard) and can plan to be short those forces during their other upcoming peace operation missions. However, during MTW training phase, commanders can plan on having their entire unit focus on the Army's primary mission - fighting and winning the nations wars. This rotation schedule gives each Corps its turn to be the lead element in MTW response. It creates a sense of urgency across the Army as it eliminates the perception of the "have" and "have not" Corps. We must take full advantage of all forces in the Army and can not afford to have units in name only. While every soldier hopes we never have to go to war, preparation is the best deterrent known at this time. This rotation schedule ensures all the Army's Corps are prepared in turn for a full spectrum of future operations.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: DIVISION STRUCTURE

The Army needs to decide on the design of the Corps for the rotating schedule. There are two options that come to mind for the new Corps structure. First is to have each of the eight divisions similar (perhaps with a heavy, medium, and light brigade). This concept is similar to the concept proposed by

Doug MacGregor in his book, Breaking the Phalanx. The key to success here would be the diverse division support command that would be needed to support such and organization. However, with the future reach-back logistics capability and the ongoing revolution in military logistics, support difficulties should not be a reason to dismiss the common division approach to the eight rotating divisions. A second force structure for the Corps that will fill these rotating missions would be to have one heavy and one medium weight division. The Corps could have one division (heavy) with perhaps 2 brigades of armor/mech and one motorized brigade. The other division (medium) could have two motorized or medium brigades with a light brigade. While this design would be conceptually more supportable, it would also allow for the division commander to posses similar type brigades for maneuver without having to cross attach divisional brigades.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: PERSONNEL POLICIES

This rotation schedule would allow the personnel replacement system to focus on filling the Corps and Divisions in the beginning of either their MTW training phase or in their shaping preparation (training) phase. Thus, if the above training calendar is adopted then each year, from April through September two Corps would be priority of fill for replacements. Additionally, the other two Corps would be priority of fill during the months of October through March. This changing or oscillating priority of fill meets the Army Chief of Staff's guidance to "fill the tactical units (divisions) to 100%". Since the Corps full rotation cycle time is two years, this rotation schedule would permit each battalion, brigade, and division commander to experience all four stages in the rotation schedule during their command tours. Thus, there would be equality, in that each commander has similar opportunities for deployment and action in both peace operations and potential war.

From a reserve component point of view, their 270-day activation supports this rotation cycle time. 270 days allows the reservist 30-60 days for mobilization and preparation before deployment, six months (180 days) deployed on either a Peace Keeping Mission or MTW with their habitual Division or Corps, and then 30-60 days for demobilization and return to home station. This would permit the active and reserve components of the Army to train together and deploy together fostering a unity of effort between the AC/RC components and common achievements, COHORT style.

In the future, National Guard divisions and enhanced brigades could become affiliated with certain Corps. This would allow for habitual training opportunities and would give the Corps commander units that could be tasked or mobilized to fulfill tasks in support of either MOOTW or MTW missions. This would afford the stability to the Reserve Component forces similar to the active forces and allow these forces to practice the standard operation procedures for the Corps that they would routinely join during activation and mobilization.

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ROTATION SCHEDULE: IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

The costs of this rotation schedule run deeper than they may first appear. With each Corps having a similar capability, there is a cost to bring each of the Corps up to a common level of expertise. Additionally, since the Army is a power projection force, it follows that each Corps should be located in the vicinity of a power projection platform. There may be additional costs in creating similar divisions. This would require possibly restructuring divisions and there would be an institutional cost the Army would have to bear. This restructuring would require the Army to decide on whether each of the eight rotating divisions is similar, or if each corps is similar with one heavy and one medium weight active component division. The adoption of this rotating schedule for Army, while expensive, is needed for strengthening the Army's relevance and readiness as we progress into the future.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: POLITICAL COSTS

This rotation schedule will not be free. Implicit in this plan is the participation of V US Corps with both of its divisions. This is a highly political decision. However, the common argument that we will not fight a war in the Fulda gap dictates V Corps could be used for out of Europe operations - similar to the way VII Corps participated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This including V Corps in the rotational schedule would require a clean break between USAREUR and V Corps headquarters. USAREUR has been building/designing their own power projection platform in the Kaiserslautern area. This power projection capability and the political willingness to employ V Corps away from Europe are prerequisites for a European stationed V Corps joining the Army wide rotation schedule.

ROTATION SCHEDULE: INSTITUTIONAL COSTS

The Army will experience an institutional cost of restructuring divisions within the rotating schedule. While most divisions are heavy (Mechanized or Armor) or light, several divisions with very proud histories may feel they are being delegated to a common level within the Army. The full impact of this redesign and restructuring can not be addressed until the decision is made as to the division structure for the rotating Army. This is a large issue for the Army. To meet the Chief of Staff's deployment requirements, large changes are needed in the Army structure, and this one change could be incorporated as well. However, this is an internal Army issue and needs to be decided by the Army, for the Army, in support of future operational needs in terms of relevance and readiness.

CONCLUSION

For the Army of the future to be useful to the nation it must be both relevant to the given political situation and ready to respond across the full spectrum of operations. Relevance requires that the Army be applicable and ready for a full spectrum of operations from:

- domestic support of local disasters;
- to humanitarian assistance at home and abroad;
- to peace operations including peace keeping, peace making, and peace enforcement;
- to military operations other than war;
- to fighting and winning our nations wars.

Relevance is required across the full spectrum of future Army operations. However, relevance alone is not sufficient. The Army needs to be ready for operations spanning this full spectrum of operations. Readiness is only achieved when leaders know their missions, have the required resources, training, and preparation time for those missions, and finally execute those assigned missions with vigor and professionalism. While we prepare to engage a full spectrum of operations, we can no longer afford to only prepare for war and treat all the other operations as missions to be accomplished "on the fly". The easiest way for the Army to lose its relevance with the American people and our political leadership is to either fail or appear unprofessional in the conduct of our assigned missions where ever those missions fall within the full spectrum of operations. The Army lost relevance with our political leaders and the American people during Kosovo with the deployment of Task Force Hawk. When the Army is called upon to execute a mission, we either need to execute vigorously and professionally or respectfully decline the mission. The future Army needs to maintain and strengthen both its relevance and readiness for a full spectrum of operations to remain a viable force with public support and Congressional backing. The discussed rotation schedule for the four Army Corps gives an easily understandable answer to the question of "How is the Army preparing to assist the country". This simple rotation plan will foster understand of Army operations and preparation, leading to increased relevance with the American people and our elected leadership while also better preparing our units for their assigned tasks and injecting a degree of predictability for the common soldier. The Army is small and our missions are to numerous for everyone not being fully engaged. The time is ripe to make this change and adopt this rotation schedule to bolster Army relevance and readiness as we begin to execute missions in a new millennium across the full spectrum of operations.

Word Count = 5,442

ANNEX A – SURVEY RESULTS FROM AWC 2000

This annex shows the survey and results from this year's calls of Army War College students. This survey is the same as last year's that was conducted by Joe Nizolak with the exception that questions 13 and 14 were reordered so all pre-deployment questions are addressed before deployment questions are asked.

1. What is your branch of service:
   [100] Army
   [5] Navy
   [11] Air Force
   [2] USMC
   [3] Other

2. What is your component:
   [94] Active
   [6] Reserve
   [10] Guard
   [7] Civilian

3. Do you believe that Peace Operation tasks should be included in unit METLs:
   [90] Yes
   [30] No

4. Given realistic time constraints, what percent of your warfighting METL tasks are you willing to neglect in order to train on Peace Operation tasks:

[32] None	[9] 31% - 40%	[0] 71% - 80%
[16] 1% - 10 %	[7] 41% - 50%	[0] 81% - 90%
[30] 11% - 20%	[1] 51% - 60%	[1] 91% - 100%
[21] 21% - 30%	[0] 61% - 70%	

The interesting point here is to presort by peace operations participation and compare the training need by those who have participated to those who have not:

The below graph shows the distribution of all ACW 2000 students that would favor neglecting METL training to conduct training for peace operations. The distribution can be thought of as a probability density function which due to the law of large numbers should follow a normal disrtibution.

Class Total Training Requirements

For any discrete probability density function the mean or expected value can be calculated as the sum of x*f(x) or the sum of the value of each cell times the probability of the occurrence of that cell. Hence,

$E(x) = Sum[x*f(x)] =$

$= 0(32/117) + 5(16/117) + 15(30/117) + 25(21/117) + 35(9/117) + 45(7/117) + 55(1/117) + 65(0/117) + 75(0/117) + 85(0/117) + 95(1/117) =$

$E(x) = 15.68$

Likewise the variance can be calculated as well:

$Variance = sigma^2 = Sum (x-mean)^2$

$sigma^2 = 32(0-15.68)^2 + 16(5-15.68)^2 + 30(15-15.68)^2 + 21(25-15.68)^2 + 9(35-15.68)^2 + 7(45-15.68)^2 + 1(55-15.68)^2 + 0(65-15.68)^2 + 0(75-15.68)^2 + 0(85-15.68)^2 + 1(95-15.68)^2 =$

$sigma^2 = 54,336$

Since the standard deviation is the square root of the variance then sigma =

Standard deviation = 213

PEACE OPERATION PARTICPANTS:

[16] None   [4] 31% - 40%   [0] 71% - 80%
[3] 1% - 10 %   [1] 41% - 50%   [0] 81% - 90%
[15] 11% - 20%   [1] 51% - 60%   [1] 91% - 100%
[9] 21% - 30%   [0] 61% - 70%

PO Participants Training Requirements

$E(x) = Sum[x*f(x)] =$

$= 0(16/50) + 5(3/50) + 15(15/50) + 25(9/50) + 35(4/50) + 45(1/50) + 55(1/50) + 65(0/50) + 75(0/50) + 85(0/50) + 95(1/50) =$

$E(x) = 16.00$

The recognition of the need to train for peace operations is not tied (independent) of the experience of the individual who has conducted peace operations. This can be validated by showing similar results from the group that has not participated in peace operations.

PEACE OPERATION NON-PARTICIPANTS:

[16] None	[5] 31% - 40%	[0] 71% - 80%
[13] 1% - 10 %	[6] 41% - 50%	[0] 81% - 90%
[15] 11% - 20%	[0] 51% - 60%	[0] 91% - 100%
[12] 21% - 30%	[0] 61% - 70%	

Non-Participants Training Requirements

$E(x) = Sum[x*f(x)] =$

$= 0(16/67) + 5(13/67) + 15(15/67) + 25(12/67) + 35(5/67) + 45(6/67) + 55(0/67) + 65(0/67) + 75(0/67) + 85(0/67) + 95(0/67) =$

$E(x) = 15.45$

Again, the mean of the conditional probability of a desire to train given the respondent has not participated in peace operations even when that training requires the METL training to be neglected is approximately the same. This is irrefutable, when the standard deviation of the overall sample (117 Army War College students) that answered this question.

CONCLUSION: The requirement to train for peace operations is independent of whether or not the individual surveyed has participated in peace operation. Clearly, the Army as a whole has recognized the need for training for peace operations or military operations other than war.

5. Have you ever participated in a Peace Operation: Peace Keeping, Peace Enforcement, Humanitarian Assistance, etc.?

[22] YES, one Peace Operation
[16] YES, two Peace Operations
[13] YES, three or more Peace Operations
[1] No, but I joined a unit just returning from a Peace Operation
[70] NO, I've never participated in a Peace Operation
    IF NO - stop here and turn in survey.

Peace Opns by Class (%)

1997 1998 1999 2000

ANALYSIS: While the number of zero peace operations has increased – it may be due to the fact that only 5 questions are needed to be answered and then the student is "done". Overall, the distribution is relatively unchanged.

Please answer questions 6 - 33 for each Peace Operation in which you participated OR in which the unit you joined participated.

6a. Operation Name: _____

6b. Operation Type:
    [14] humanitarian assistance
    [17] traditional peace keeping
    [27] peace enforcement
    [6] domestic support
    [2] other: specify _____

Type of Peace Operation (%)

	Hum Asst	Trad PK	Trad PE	Dom Spt	Other
1997	41	22	15	17	5
1998	23	38	21	14	4
1999	24	10	48	10	8
2000	21	26	41	9	3

ANALYSIS: Again, very little change from other years.

6c. Duration of your unit's involvement (MM/YY - MM/YY) _____

6d. Your position in the unit: _____

6e. Type of Unit:
    [13] Combat (Heavy)
    [17] Combat (Light)
    [9] Combat Support
    [11] Combat Service Support
    [0] Special Services
    [2] Health Services
    [3] Other: _____

6f. Unit's normal basing:
    [24] CONUS
    [20] Europe
    [3] other

PREDEPLOYMENT QUESTIONS

7. Did your unit's METL include tasks required for the Peace Operations?
   [23] None
   [15] Few
   [2] About half
   [8] Most
   [1] All

Peace Opns Tasks in METL (%)

ANALYSIS: 78% of the respondents had none or only few peace operations tasks in their METL. This a almost a 50% increase over each of the three previous years report. With the present deployment/employment rate of the army this is alarming. Are we "burying our heads in the sand?" We need to train these tasks to be prepared for successful mission execution.

8. Did the Peace Operation require critical tasks not listed on your unit METL?
   [21] No
   [28] Yes (List below)

9. How did your unit primarily train for critical Peace Operation tasks?
   [17] Normal METL training program
   [34] Special Ramp-Up: _____ weeks
   [18] OJT (On the job training) on location
   [1] Other: _____

10. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness on its normal METL skills?
   [21] Combat ready (e.g. C-1)
   [19] Combat ready with minor limitations (e.g. C-2)
   [9] Combat ready with major limitations (e.g. C-3)
   [2] Not Combat ready

Pre-Deployment Combat Readiness (%)

	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
1997	64	31	0	4
1998	69	31	0	0
1999	55	42	3	0
2000	41	37	18	4

☐ 1997 ☐ 1998 ☐ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: This chart clearly shows a decrease in combat readiness especially at the C-3 and C-4 levels. The key question is "Why is combat readiness decreasing?" Could combat readiness be decreasing because of OPTEMO and peace operations (MOOTW)?

11. How was your pre-deployment **METL training** readiness assessed?
   [16] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation
   [19] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC)
   [18] Exercises
   [9] BCTP or automated/simulation evaluation
   [25] Commander's assessment - if so which commander:
        [ ] Commander of deploying unit
        [ ] Commander one level up
        [ ] Commander two levels up
   [1] Other _____
   [4] Pre deployment readiness was not assessed.

12. How was your pre-deployment **Peace Operation training** readiness assessed?
   [3] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation
   [13] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC)
   [14] Exercises
   [2] BCTP or automated/simulation evaluation
   [23] Commander's assessment - if so which commander:
        [ ] Commander of deploying unit
        [ ] Commander one level up
        [ ] Commander two levels up
   [4] Other _____
   [6] Pre deployment readiness was not assessed.

21

13. At deployment, how would you rate your unit's training readiness in critical Peace Operation Skills:
    [10] Fully trained
    [31] Trained (minor shortfalls)
    [7] Significant training shortfalls
    [2] Untrained

Deployment Peace Opns Readiness (%)

	1997	1998	1999	2000
C-1	27	34	23	20
C-2	66	57	69	62
C-3	5	8	7	14
C-4	2	1	1	4

ANALYSIS: Units are about as trained as in previous years. However, there is a small decrease in C-1 and an increase in C-3.

DEPLOYMENT

14. Compared to home station training, <u>METL task training operations during the Peace Operation</u> were:
    [2] Much greater
    [6] Greater
    [14] About the same
    [10] Less
    [14] Much less
    [3] Non-existent

**METL Training During Peace Opns (%)**

Legend: □ 1997 ▨ 1998 ▩ 1999 ■ 2000

Categories: Much Greater, Greater, Same, Less, Mush Less, Non-existent

ANALYSIS: Here we see a small increase in the METL training conducted while deployed. Many units and soldiers are beginning to understand that life goes on -- even during and after deployments.

15. Did your unit conduct other training (non-METL or Peace Operation specific training) during the Peace Operation?
    [10] Not at all
    [11] Once or twice during the deployment
    [15] Occasionally (about monthly)
    [15] Routinely about weekly)

16. Did your unit specifically address common task skills such as weapons qualification, PT and NBC training during the Peace Operation?

[9] Not at all
[8] Once or twice during the deployment
[15] Occasionally (about monthly)
[19] Routinely about weekly)

CTT Training During Peace Opns (%)

ANALYSIS: Here we see an increased amount of CTT training, again reflecting the attitude that life goes on and we need to constantly prepare for future operations.

17. Assess the overall impact of the Peace Operation on your unit's combat training readiness:
   [3] Substantially improved overall combat training readiness
   [13] Improved overall combat training readiness
   [6] No impact on combat training readiness
   [16] Minimally degraded combat training readiness
   [14] Substantially degraded combat training readiness

Impact of Peace Opns on Combat Readiness (%)

|	Substantially Improved	Improved	No Impact	Minimally Degraded	Substantially Degraded
1997	0	32	3	46	19
1998	10	26	9	43	12
1999	6	36	10	33	16
2000	6	25	12	31	27

■ 1997 ■ 1998 ■ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: For all four years where data has been collected, 50%+ has been distributed in the degraded categories (minimally and substantially). This year was no different with 58%.

18. Which skills were significantly enhanced /degraded/no change by the Peace Operation (select all that apply)

Individual	[29] Enhanced	[13] Degraded	[5] No Change
Crew	[23] Enhanced	[17] Degraded	[5] No Change
Squad	[26] Enhanced	[11] Degraded	[7] No Change
Platoon	[16] Enhanced	[23] Degraded	[6] No Change
Company	[10] Enhanced	[30] Degraded	[6] No Change
Battalion	[12] Enhanced	[28] Degraded	[5] No Change

Skills Enhanced by Peace Operations

Individual: 1997=32, 1998=33, 1999=46, 2000=66
Crew: 1997=26, 1998=32, 1999=39, 2000=52
Squad: 1997=15, 1998=16, 1999=32, 2000=59
Platoon: 1997=18, 1998=28, 1999=33, 2000=36
Company: 1997=8, 1998=18, 1999=33, 2000=23
Battalion: 1997=8, 1998=13, 1999=32, 2000=27

□ 1997 ▨ 1998 ▨ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: The positive view indicated that the individuals, crews, and squads are getting valuable training out of peace operations. This point of view was fostered by the Rand study Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness. Further, this may have been bolstered by the CTT and other training that reportedly has been conducted during peace operations.

Skills Degraded by Peace Operations

Individual: 1997: 17, 1998: 24, 1999: 35, 2000: 30
Crew: 1997: 12, 1998: 23, 1999: 34, 2000: 39
Squad: 1997: 10, 1998: 22, 1999: 39, 2000: 25
Platoon: 1997: 18, 1998: 17, 1999: 40, 2000: 52
Company: 1997: 21, 1998: 28, 1999: 43, 2000: 68
Battalion: 1997: 23, 1998: 31, 1999: 49, 2000: 64

Legend: ▣ 1997 ▩ 1998 ▨ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: This is alarming. The platoon, company, and battalion readiness has been degraded by almost a 25% increase across the board. Now 2/3 of the responders think the company and battalion are degraded by peace operations. This is the key to the future – we need to prepare our units better and recover them in a set manner.

19. To what extent did your Peace Operation tasks complement and or replicate your critical "go to war tasks"
    [4] Not at all
    [14] To some degree - 25% or less match
    [18] To some degree - 50% match
    [9] To a great degree - 75% match

20. During the Peace Operation, were normal reporting standards and criteria used to report readiness (e.g. Unit Status report - USR)
    [26] Yes
    [15] No, we used different reporting standards
    [9] No, we were not required to report

RECOVERY

21. After your unit returned, how long was your unit's dedicated recovery period. That is how long did your higher headquarters allow you to provide leave time for your soldiers, service your equipment and train to your services established standards on your go to war tasks before assessing your readiness or declaring you were ready to go to war.

[11] No recovery
[2] 1 week
[2] 2 weeks
[1] 3 weeks
[12] 1 month
[5] 2 months
[4] 3 months
[13] over 3 months

ANALYSIS: These results are interesting. Acording to question 21 we are now giving more time to recover units. However in question 22 we are not recovering our personnel, equipment, or training to the standards we used to do.

22. Was the time allocated sufficient to restore your unit to full combat readiness in the following categories:

Personnel:	[27] Yes	[20] No	
Equipment	[27] Yes	[20] No	
Training	[13] Yes	[33] No	

Adequacy of Recovery Period
Personnel, Equipment and Training

Bar chart showing data for PER-YES, PER-NO, EQU-YES, EQU-NO, TNG-YES, TNG-NO across years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.

PER-YES: 31, 43, 41, 27
PER-NO: 12, 18, 24, 20
EQU-YES: 31, 38, 41, 27
EQU-NO: 12, 21, 24, 20
TNG-YES: 21, 30, 30, 13
TNG-NO: 22, 29, 35, 33

Legend: ☐ 1997 ▨ 1998 ▩ 1999 ■ 2000

23. How was your unit's METL training readiness assessed after recovery: select one:
[8] ARTEP or Service standardized training evaluation
[18] Combat Training Center rotation (NTC, JRTC, CMTC)
[12] Exercises
[5] BCTP or automated/simulation evaluation
[20] Commander's assessment - if so which commander:
     [ ] Commander of deploying unit
     [ ] Commander one level up
     [ ] Commander two levels up
[7] Other _____

24. If your unit experienced degraded unit raining after the Peace Operation recovery, what were the main factors, (trainng detractors), which impacted your unit (please list)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

25. How many weeks after your unit's recovery period do you believe it would have taken your unit to prepare for and successfully execute an:
    (a) ARTEP or service standardized training requirement   _____ weeks
   (b) CTC rotation (NTC/JRTC/CMTC)   _____ weeks
   (c) MTW support   _____ weeks

YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PEACE OPERATION IMPACTS

26. Had your unit been called upon to deploy to an MTW prior to the time you listed above, do you think the impact of training readiness shortfalls would have resulted in:
    [2] Mission failure
    [7] Mission success with significant casualties
    [21] Mission success with moderate casualties
    [17] Mission success with few casualties

27. After the Peace operation, did you notice a measurable impact with your unit's physical fitness:
    [3] Large improvement
    [10] Small improvement
    [4] No impact
    [23] Small decrease
    [9] Large decrease

Impact on Physical Fitness (%)

	Lagre Imp	Small Imp	No Impact	Small Dec	Large Dec
1998	7	13	37	26	17
1999	1	8	43	39	8
2000	6	20	8	47	18

■ 1998 ▨ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: This is the first year where more than 50% thought there was a decrease (small + large) in PT. This runs counter to the notion that there is increased training (CTT) ongoing during deployments. The large decrease in "no impact" may have been caused by the increasing lengths of deployments and the increasing decrease in PT proficiency.

28. How did you measure the change in the level of physical fitness?
    [34] Service standard physical fitness test
    [13] Informal assessment - such a number unable to complete unit run
    [12] Subjective assessment

29. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit morale?
    [16] Unit morale greatly improved
    [18] Unit morale slightly improved
    [9] Unit morale remained the same
    [8] Unit morale slightly decreased
    [0] Unit morale greatly decreased

Impact on Unit Morale (%)

	Great Imp	Small Imp	Remain Same	Small Dec	Great Dec
1999	28	27	27	14	4
2000	31	35	18	16	0

☐ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: This chart shows that soldiers are proud of their accomplishments. We need to do a better job of articulating their pride to the American people.

30. Is your assessment on morale based on a command climate survey?
    [16] Yes
    [33] No

31

31. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on unit re-enlistment?
  [4] Re-enlistment greatly improved
  [18] Re-enlistment slightly improved
  [20] Re-enlistment remained the same
  [5] Re-enlistment slightly decreased
  [2] Re-enlistment greatly decreased

Impact on Re-enlistment (%)

	Great Imp	Small Imp	Remain Same	Small Dec	Great Dec
1999	6	19	53	22	0
2000	8	35	38	10	10

▨ 1999 ■ 2000

ANALYSIS: While this curve is now flatter, the point to watch is the increase in the far right column "Great Decrease". The Army is beginning to experience a drain of able-bodied soldiers. If peace operations are the cause for this decrease in retention then changes need to be made.

32. What is your assessment of the impact of this Peace Operation on junior officer retention?
   [2]   Retention greatly improved
   [9]   Retention slightly improved
   [28]   Retention remained the same
   [10]   Retention slightly decreased
   [2]   Retention greatly decreased

Peace Operations Effect on Junior Officer Retention

Category	1999	2000
Great Imp	3	4
Small Imp	14	18
Reman Same	55	55
Small Dec	24	20
GreatDec	4	4
	0	0

ANALYSIS: There has been no change in this area, Junior Officer Retention.

ENDNOTES

[1] Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff), 26.

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[3] The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Incorporated, Springfield, Massachusetts: 441.

[4] Ibid: 433.

[5] Steve Buyer, "Military Recruitment and Retention: What's the Problem," VFW Magazine, February 2000, 29.

[6] MG Bruce Scott, "The Army and Legislative Affairs," Military Review March-April 1999, 20.

[7] Robert H. Williams, "Lessons Learned in Kosovo Shape Future Weapon Buy." National Defense, September 1999: 18-19

[8] William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), 11.

[9] Ibid 12

[10] Joint Vision 2010,

[11] LTG Larry R. Ellis, "Training For Full-Spectrum Operations," Army, October 1999, 136.

[12] Floyd D. Spence, Chairman House Committee on National Security, Military Readiness 1997: Rhetoric and Reality, April 9, 1997, 9.

[13] Clinton, 11

[14] Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army, "Investing in the Army's Future", Army, October 1999, 18.

[15] Ronald E. Sortor, Army Forces for Operations Other Than War, (Rand Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, California, 1997), 56-57.

[16] Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin, and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, (Rand Arroyo Center, Santa Monica, California, 1998), 57.

[17] See survey results - question #5

[18] MG David L. Grange, "Ready for What?," Armed Forces Journal, December 1999, 42.

[19] Mark Thompson, "Ready or Not?," Time, 22 November 1999, 50.

[20] COL Robert B. Killebrew, "The Army of the 21st Century", Army, January 2000, 9.

[21] National Military Strategy of the United States of America, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era, 1997, 11.

[22] Ibid, 11.

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